Video Of The Week - BBC goes inside Gaza
tunnel - http://tinyurl.com/h7ny7xx
By Dan
Feferman , The Tower Magazine. For
the full article go to - http://tinyurl.com/jylcx6s
Is another Gaza war inevitable? Judging by the latest
reports in the Israeli media, it might seem that way. At a funeral for seven
Hamas militants killed in a tunnel collapse, Hamas’ Gaza-based chief
Ismail Haniyeh declared that the so-called “terror tunnels” are a mainstay of
the terrorist group’s strategy against Israel. A senior Israeli defense
official told reporters that Hamas has mostly rebuilt
its tunnel infrastructure, which Israel destroyed in Operation Protective Edge
in 2014. During the operation, the IDF demolished 32 tunnels, 14 of which
crossed into Israel for the purpose of conducting terror attacks. Hamas
publically confirmed their ongoing efforts to rebuild the tunnels by praising
its subterranean heroes who are “toiling day and night” on reconstruction.
Meanwhile, reports have trickled
out of Gaza that six tunnels collapsed over the past two months, killing
at least thirteen Gazans.
The debate further heated up when a sneak peek at a
State Comptroller report showed great dissatisfaction with how the Israeli
Defense Ministry was handling the tunnel threat. Residents in communities near
the Gaza border complain that they can hear and feel digging under their homes.
In response, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu promised he would respond
appropriately to all threats and “will act very forcefully against Hamas, and
with much more force than…Protective Edge.” Opposition leader Isaac Herzog, not
to be outdone, called on Netanyahu to “bomb the tunnels and destroy this
threat.…Why are we waiting? For terrorists with…weapons drawn to emerge in a
kibbutz?” Jewish Home leader Naftali Bennett similarly called for a
preemptive attack on the tunnels. In any case, the public remains on edge.
But is war inevitable? And is it the best option?
By 2009’s Operation Cast Lead, Hamas’ use of tunnels
had evolved into a clear threat. In 2012’s Operation Pillar of Defense, the IDF
targeted the tunnels as much as it did Hamas’ rocket capabilities. In 2013, a
large tunnel was discovered that led to an Israeli town. It was clearly
intended for a large-scale terrorist attack. An even bigger tunnel was
discovered later that year.
During Protective Edge, a major tunnel infiltration
aimed at the residents of a kibbutz near the Gaza border was thwarted just as
terrorists were emerging on the Israeli side. Four more such attacks would be
interdicted, some with the Hamas fighters having already crossed into Israel.
What had originally been an operation to halt Hamas’ rocket fire evolved into
an operation to neutralize the tunnel threat.
Clearly, then, the tunnel infrastructure is both Hamas’
primary military asset and a major threat to Israel’s security. How can
Israel effectively combat it?
The history of warfare is, in essence, a history of
constant adaptation to an enemy’s capabilities. The tunnels were born out of
this competition. They are classic examples of asymmetric warfare, in
which a much weaker enemy takes advantage of the vulnerabilities of a
militarily stronger force. But it is important to differentiate between the
three distinct types of tunnels used by Hamas, and explore their tactical and
strategic importance.
The original tunnels, as noted, were and still are used
to smuggle arms and commercial goods from Egypt to Gaza. Hamas substantially
expanded this infrastructure after 2007 and Israel’s imposition of a blockade.
At the time, it is estimated that there were as many as 2,500 such tunnels
running between Gaza and Egypt in the area of Rafah.
A second type of tunnel is the tactical or “defensive”
variety. These are meant to assist Hamas in its next war if Israel sends in
ground troops. They form a subterranean web underneath Gaza, and give fighters
and commanders freedom of movement, allowing them to evade capture, hide from
aerial assault, and maintain the element of surprise. Rockets, launchers, and
ammunition are also stored in these tunnels, so Hamas can continue firing even
while under aerial attack. Hamas commanders are said to have personal tunnels
for themselves and their families
It is the third type of tunnel, however, which is most
worrying—the terror tunnels. Given Israel’s security fence and buffer zone on
the border, Hamas was left with essentially two options for launching attacks
on Israel—going over the fence, via rockets and mortars, or going under it. And
since Israel’s anti-missile capabilities have advanced to the point where the
rocket threat is largely neutralized, Hamas shifted its investments
underground.
IDF intelligence and military planners have been aware
of this emerging threat for some time now, with Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot
affirming that it is now one of the army’s main priorities. Despite this and
nearly a billion shekels (about $250 million) spent over the past decade in
search of a solution, there are still only a limited number of ways to detect
and fight the tunnels—which is primarily why Hamas is so keen on using them.
As far as detection, technologies are still limited,
although the Israeli Ministry of Defense has been working around the clock on
the problem for some time. Successful early testing was conducted this past
year, but an operational solution—essentially an Iron Dome for tunnels—is still
a ways off.
There is a tragic side to Hamas’ tunnel strategy. Roughly
9,000 homes were destroyed during Protective Edge, and very few have been
rebuilt. This is not Israel’s fault, as building supplies flow regularly into
Gaza. But according to declassified intelligence reports, these supplies are
routinely stolen by Hamas in order to serve the group’s terrorist purposes.
Hamas smuggles in cement, diverts from construction and humanitarian donations,
and even raids civilian construction sites in order to rebuild its tunnels.
Estimates are that one tunnel can cost a million dollars to
build and uses around 50,000 tons of concrete. Close to a million tons of
concrete were poured into the terror tunnels before 2014.
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